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Abstract
This paper brings together divergent approaches to time inconsistency
from macroeconomic policy and behavioural economics. Developing Barro
and Gordon’s models of rules, discretion and reputation, behavioural
discount functions from behavioural microeconomics are embedded into
Barro and Gordon’s game-theoretic analysis of temptation versus enforce-
ment to construct an encompassing model, nesting combinations of time
consistent and time inconsistent preferences. The analysis presented in
this paper shows that, with hyperbolic/quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the
enforceable range of inflation targets is narrowed. This suggests limits to
the effectiveness of monetary targets, under certain conditions. The pa-
per concludes with a discussion of monetary policy implications, explored
specifically in the light of current macroeconomic policy debates.
JEL codes: D03 E03 E52 E61
Keywords: time-inconsistency behavioural macroeconomics macroeconomic
policy
1 Introduction
Contrasting analyses of time inconsistency are presented in macroeconomic pol-
icy and behavioural economics - the first from a rational expectations perspec-
tive [12, 6, 7], and the second building on insights from behavioural economics
about bounded rationality and its implications in terms of present bias and
hyperbolic/quasi-hyperbolic discounting [13, 11, 8, 9, 18]. Given the divergent
assumptions about rational choice across these two approaches, it is not so sur-
prising that there have been few attempts to reconcile these different analyses
of time inconsistency.
This paper fills the gap by exploring the distinction between inter-personal
time inconsistency (rational expectations models) and intra-personal time incon-
sistency (behavioural economic models). This raises questions about the role
of institutional reform (e.g. inflation targetting and other monetary targets,
central bank independence) versus behaviour change (”nudging”) in ameliorat-
ing the negative impacts from these different forms of time inconsistency. In
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developing this analysis, sections I and II outline the key features of the ratio-
nal expectations and behavioural economics models. Then, in Section III, the
divergent approaches are reconciled via an encompassing model of strategic in-
teractions between macroeconomic policy-makers and agents, building on Barro
and Gordon’s monetary policy model [7]. Section IV outlines macroeconomic
policy implications and conclusions.
2 Time Inconsistency: Rational Expectations Mod-
els
Mainstream macroeconomic theory assumes rational expectations and inter-
temporal utility maximisation, building on microfoundations consistent with
subjective expected utility theory [23, 21]. Preferences - including time and
risk preferences - are assumed to be independent, complete, stationary and
consistent. Specifically for the rate of time preference, time-separable utility
requires that preferences are consistent through time so that inter-temporal
trade-offs are independent of when they occur. For example, with a stable rate
of time preference, a choice between consumption in a year versus a year and a
day would be equivalent to a choice between consumption in a decade versus a
decade and a day. When the additional assumption of efficient financial markets
is added, agents will balance their rate of time preference with the real interest
rate. These assumptions are embedded in the ”policy ineffectiveness” critiques
of Lucas, Sargent, Wallace and others, which focussed on the limitations of
discretionary demand management and its reliance on counter-cyclical monetary
and fiscal policy levers [14, 15, 19, 20].
Building on these insights, Kydland and Prescott proposed time inconsis-
tency as an explanation for the stagflationary episodes of the 1970s [12]. Effec-
tively operating as if in a strategic game with policy-makers, forward-looking
rational agents will predict inflationary consequences from current expansionary
policies, pre-empting inflationary erosion of their future real wages by increasing
their nominal wage demands today. The consequences will be macroeconomic
because, if all rational agents raise their nominal wage demands at the same
time, then inflation will become a self-fulfilling prophecy as prices are pushed
up by increasing wage costs. A sub-optimal Nash equilibrium will emerge in
which rational agents’ dominant strategy of increased nominal wage demands is
neutralised by inflation, and everyone suffers from the inflationary bias which
emerges as a consequence.
Kydland and Prescott developed their concept of time inconsistency to cap-
ture the consequences of discretionary policy-making when rational private
agents have opportunities to plan for the consequences of policies. Policies are
time inconsistent when a policy devised to be optimal in one period will change
the world (in this case by changing rational agents’ expectations). Consequently,
a policy designed to be optimal in the first period is no longer optimal in the
next period, and the cause of its sub-optimality is itself i.e. its own impacts on
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private agents’ expectations. In the case of discretionary demand management,
private agents will shift their inflation expectations when discretionary policies
are announced, rationally foreseeing the inflationary consequences of pushing
an economy beyond full employment. So the policy designed to be optimal ex-
ante, assuming static expectations, will not be optimal ex-post because rational
agents expectations shift in response to the policy.
What are the rational expectations alternatives to discretionary policy-making?
Rational expectations theorists argued that, if the rules of the policy-making
game are clear and transparent, then there will be no incentive for rational
agents strategically to raise their wage demands. Sub-optimal outcomes emerge
from strategic interactions between rational agents and macroeconomic policy-
makers because policy-makers lack credibility in terms of their commitments to
a full-employment target. If rational agents can be made to believe that policy-
makers will stick to their full-employment targets, then the problem disappears.
Important theoretical contributions to the analysis of credibility in macroe-
conomic policy-making include the models of Barro and Gordon, which add
reputation-building by macroeconomic policy-makers into the rational expecta-
tions story [6, 7]. Barro and Gordon argue that concomitant high inflation and
high unemployment were the consequence of non-credible commitments by mon-
etary policy-makers, reflecting the fact that policymakers are tempted to push
the economy beyond full employment in order to boost employment and produc-
tion in the short term. When rational private agents know that policy-makers
have these incentives to ”cheat” by inflating the economy beyond full employ-
ment equilibrium, then those policies can be undermined. A non-cooperative
equilibrium will emerge, in much the same way as described by Kydland and
Prescott and, under these circumstances, the twin macroeconomic policy goals
of controlling inflation and reducing unemployment to its natural rate cannot
be attained. Nonetheless, policy-makers can be distracted from the tempta-
tion to cheat on their policy commitments in short-term if they are concerned
by their reputations for policy-making credibility in the long-term. Far-sighted
policy-makers will take into account rational private agents’ perceptions of their
credibility. If policy-makers are aware that their policy levers will be blunted
in the future if their reputations are damaged today, then they will have incen-
tives to change their strategies. There is an inter-temporal trade-off and so the
policy-maker’s rate of time preference becomes salient and the strategic policy
game described by Kydland and Prescott shifts to a dynamic context and the
Nash reversion strategy (”grim trigger” strategy) will be determined by discount
rates. Specifically, forward-looking decision-makers, with a lower rate of time
preference, will value their reputations more highly than decision-makers with
a higher rate of time preference. It follows that forward-looking policy-makers
will be less likely to cheat on their commitments, even though - if they were
playing just a one-shot game - they would otherwise revert to a non-cooperative
strategy [10, 3, 2].
In addressing these insights, received wisdom in macroeconomic policy-making
circles shifted towards advocacy of inflation targetting and central bank inde-
pendence as solutions. These insights had applications to other policy questions
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too, including industrial organisation and regulatory policy. For monetary pol-
icy, institutional reforms were widely adopted across the OECD, including in
the UK and Australia - with New Zealand as a pioneer. Inevitably, however,
debates around best practice have moved on, especially quickly in the case of
monetary policy given the low inflation/low interest rate environment affecting
most OECD economies in the aftermath of the 2007/8 financial crises. With the
behavioural economics revolution, new insights can be added to these debates,
as explored in the next section.
3 Time Inconsistency in Behavioral Economics
The rational expectations account has significant limitations - extensively ex-
plored in enduring debates between what are sometimes simplistically cate-
gorised as ”Keynesians” and ”Monetarists”. These old debates reached an im-
passe in the 1970s, and contributed to significant ennui about macroeconomic
theorising in policy-making circles, partly because there was little agreement
about the behavioural assumptions.1 Alongside the seismic change in policy
environment, economic theory generally has been shifting away from a focus on
rational choice towards behavioural assumptions incorporating behavioural and
psychological constraints.
Broadly, behavioural economics allows that decisions are boundedly rational
- not necessarily irrational, but limited by a range of cognitive constraints inter-
acting with the informational constraints, including adverse selection and moral
hazard, as applied extensively across other fields of economics too, e.g. by Ak-
erlof and Shiller. Macroeconomics has been slow to embed these insights, partly
because behavioural economics is largely confined to experimental data about
individual decisions and choices. The simplifying assumptions of rational, inde-
pendent, self-interested and homogenous agents that enable aggregation in con-
ventional macroeconomic models are precluded in behavioural macroeconomic
models, though empirical techniques such as agent-based modelling provide al-
ternatives [4, 5]. Nonetheless, behavioural economics’ reach is now extending
as new macroeconomic insights are uncovered using the lens of behavioural eco-
nomics.
Temporal discounting is a promising area for behavioural macroeconomists
generally, and specifically for macroeconomic policy where discounting assump-
tions can be adapted to build a deeper understanding of the nature and con-
sequences of the strategic games between policy-makers and private agents, as
explored in the preceding section.
There are, however, some fundamental differences in definitions of time in-
consistency that need to be addressed explicitly in order to build a coherent
1These debates spawned a complex range of intermediate models - including New Keynesian
and neo-Keynesian models, which combine traditionally Keynesian assumptions about sticky
prices and imperfect markets, with the traditionally monetarist behavioural assumptions of
optimisation and rational expectations. In the aftermath of the 2007/8 financial crises, for
some macroeconomic policy-makers, the exclusion of the financial side from these models
further eroded the credibility of mainstream macroeconomic theorising.
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model. Specifically on the theme of time inconsistency - behavioural economics
introduces substantive differences in its definitions/conceptions of time incon-
sistency relative to Kydland and Prescott’s definition. The difference can be
explained via a distinction between inter-personal time inconsistency - consis-
tent with the rational expectations account outlined above, and intra-personal
time inconsistency. Intra-personal time inconsistency is sometimes described by
behavioural economists as the outcome of intra-personal struggles between dif-
ferent selves [9], building on Strotz’s early insight that inter-temporal decision-
making was characterised by intertemporal tussles between different incarna-
tions of the individual through time, manifested when the preferences of the
present self and future selves collide [22]. These tussles manifest in present bias
and preference reversals. For example, when a person is planning for a long
distant future, they may believe themselves capable of resisting temptation, but
when temptation becomes more immediate and tangible, then their preferences
change and they are not able to resist temptation after all. Their preference for
resisting temptation reverses.
The behavioural concept of intra-personal time inconsistency connects with
the more general literature on behavioural bias in behavioural economics.2
To summarise the different impacts of inter-personal time inconsistency ver-
sus intra-personal time inconsistency: in rational expectations models of inter-
personal time inconsistency, rational agents’ stable time preferences are char-
acterised by an exponential discount function. Given dynamic strategic games
between policy-makers and rational agents in the rational expectations models
explored above, this creates what can be understood as a form of institutional
present bias. Its behavioural corollary, emerging when assumptions of perfectly
rational decision-making and rational expectations are relaxed, is behavioural
present bias, and this is a product of intra-personal time inconsistency. The dif-
ferent impacts of behavioural present bias on inter-temporal decision-making are
captured by embedding hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discount functions into
inter-temporal trade-offs instead of the standard exponential discount functions
[13, 11].3
An empirical advantage for models incorporating behavioural discount func-
tions is the wide-ranging experimental evidence from psychological and be-
havioural economic studies confirming the endemicity of present bias in decision-
making by humans and other animals, demonstrating that individuals’ rate of
time preference is not stable as assumed in standard economic discounted utility
models [9, 8, 18]. Behavioural time inconsistency is manifested as shifts in an in-
dividuals rate of time preference depending on the time horizons over which they
are constructing their choices. This interpersonal time inconsistency problem
creates a problem of present bias, i.e. a disproportionate focus on short-term
2Though, it should be acknowledged that there is considerable divergence across be-
havioural economists about the meaning and significance of behavioural bias.
3There is more conscilience in the definitions than commonly acknowledged because be-
havioural present bias is not precluded in seminal ”orthodox” neo-classical accounts of inter-
temporal decision-making. Early on, Samuelson acknowledged that exponential discounting
was potentially an excessively restrictive assumption [needs ref].
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rewards and a mismatch between long-run intentions and short-run actions.
In the standard discounted utility model, the discount factor is assumed to
be constant:
max
∞∑
t=1
uτ (cτ )D(τ)dτ (1)
where u is utility and c is consumption and D(·) is the discount function:
D(t) = δt = (
1
1 + r
)t ≈ e−rt (2)
where δ is the discount factor and r is the discount rate.
In behavioural dynamic models, the discount factor declines at a greater rate
in the short run than in the long run and is inversely related to the length of delay
in rewards. So the value of future rewards is disproportionately low relative to
the value of current rewards. Mathematically behavioural/intra-personal time-
inconsistency can be captured using hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discount
functions, where the discount rate varies according to when the payoffs are
received [13, 11]. The discount factor becomes:
D(t) = βδt = β
[ 1
1 + r
]t (3)
where δ represents the time-consistent rate of time preference, and β is the
present bias parameter, capturing time-inconsistent preferences for immediate
gratification. If β = 1, then preferences are time-consistent; but if β is less
than 1 then the agent will over-weight short-term rewards relative to long-term
rewards, and the inter-temporal Euler consumption relation will break down.
There will be heterogeneity in preferences and choices. Intra-personal time
inconsistency may be moderated if agents embed pre-commitment mechanisms
into their decision-making. Angeletos et al. observe that some hyperbolic dis-
counters value commitment, and thus hold illiquid assets as for them the cost of
doing so is offset by the value of commitment [1]. O’Donoghue and Rabin pos-
tulate that different individuals will respond in different ways to the potential
for pre-commitment, depending on their type, identifying four types of individ-
uals [16, 17]. These types of agents are categorised according to two factors:
first, the extent to which they are aware of their time-inconsistency; and second,
what they do to overcome their predispositions towards present bias and prefer-
ence reversals. Adapting these definitions to the macroeconomic policy-making
ecosystem, policy makers differ in their reactions to time-inconsistency, and can
be categorised as follows:
1. Na¨ıve: These types are forward-looking but completely unaware of their
time inconsistency and likelihood of preference reversal. They na¨ıvely as-
sume that their future selves will behave tomorrow as they do today; that
their preferences formed in time t + n will be identical to those anticipated
in time t. Na¨ıfs do not take into account their own time inconsistency when
planning future actions; they choose their plans as viewed from today’s
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perspective. If βˆ is the individual’s own estimate of their quasi-hyperbolic
present bias parameter, capturing their beliefs about their own potential
for self-control, and β is their actual present bias parameter, then - for
na¨ıve individuals βˆ = 1 > β. In a macroeconomic policy context, na¨ıve
policy-makers would believe that they were making good policy choices
for the long-term, and would be unaware when their policy choices are
time inconsistent. This would increase the chances of sub-optimal Nash
equilibrium outcomes, as predicted by the rational expectations models
described above
2. Resolute: These individuals are aware of, and anticipate ex-ante, their
own intra-personal time inconsistency and so bind themselves to pre-
commitment strategies. For example, they could bind themselves with
commitment mechanisms such as long-term contracts and illiquid invest-
ments. If their pre-commitment strategies are effective in removing present
bias, then βˆ = β = 1. The ”tie me to the mast” example of Ulysses is
often used to illustrate this idea. The corollary for macroeconomic policy-
makers is the policy-maker who binds themselves to a policy target, e.g.
an inflation target, with costly sanctions for deviating from this target.
Whilst these sanctions have been implemented, in theory, as part of cen-
tral bank reform across the OECD from the 1990s onwards, sanctions on
central bankers have been difficult to implement in practice.
3. Sophisticated: These individuals backward induct to anticipate ex-ante
their own dynamic time-inconsistency. Sophisticates are aware that their
preferences change in the future and so decide not to participate, to
avoid the negative consequences of inconsistency. The common analogy is
Ulysses deciding to take a take a different route to avoid the irresistible
and deadly call of the Sirens (Hey and Panaccione, 2011). For these types,
βˆ = β in theory, but without practical implications given their decision
to avoid the inter-temporal conflict. In a macroeconomic policy context,
this would be a policy-maker who anticipates the dilemma identified by
Lucas and others, and therefore abstains from intervening to control the
macroeconomy.
4. Myopic: Myopic types decide on the basis of static preferences. They
are essentially uber-na¨ıfs in that they not only fail to recognise the pitfall
of time inconsistency but also fail to recognise the dynamic nature of the
problems they face. So they are not forward-looking at all: their present
bias parameter approaches zero, leading to a situation equivalent to an
infinite rate of time preference, and so their discount factor on future
rewards approaches zero. A ”one-shot game” discretionary policy-maker
is myopic in this sense.4
4This could be interpreted as a link between short-termist policy and Keynes’s famous
quote about ”in the long run we are all dead” as a justification for macroeconomic policy-
making myopia. But Keynes continues: ”Economists set themselves too easy, too useless
a task, if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us, that when the storm is long past,
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O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) also define a fifth type of person as partially
na¨ıve, i.e. individuals who are partially aware of their changing preferences but
not entirely and so underestimate their magnitude, that is: βˆ ∈ (β, 1)
4 A General Model: Behavioural-Strategic in-
teractions
In a macroeconomic policy framework, inflationary bias created by institutional
present bias will be magnified in the context of behavioural present bias, but
separating inter-personal and intra-personal time inconsistency to identify in-
stitutional present bias versus behavioural present bias is a complex task. This
section explores some of the implications of these complexities specifically in
the context of the macroeconomic policy debates, building on the Barro and
Gordon model introduced above.
4.1 Barro and Gordon’s reputational model of policy-making
To recap: Kydland and Prescott describe a strategic game between rational pri-
vate agents and policy-makers, explaining inflation bias as the outcome of the
sub-optimal Nash equilibrium that emerges in the context of non-cooperative
strategic decision-making [12]. Building on Kydland and Prescott, Barro and
Gordon develop the idea that sub-optimal Nash equibria emerge in the macroe-
conomy as the outcome of non-co-operative strategies between agents and policy-
makers, but with additional complexity emerging from policy-makers’ concerns
about their credibility and reputation [6, 7]. Barro and Gordon specify the
policy-maker’s objective function as:
zt = (a/2)(pit)
2
− bt(pit − pi
e
t) (4)
where a, bt > 0, pit is inflation at time t, and pi
e
t are inflationary expectations at
time t. To link with a non-accelerating rate of inflation target (NAIRU) target,
this will be achieved when pit = pi
e
t.
5 When the economy deviates away from
the NAIRU, there will be a cost in terms of inflation bias, given by:
(a/2(pit)
2) (5)
But there will also be benefits from inflationary policies, e.g. from increases
in employment and/or government revenue. These will be given by:
the ocean is flat again” (A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923), p. 80). Keynes’s words
in their entirety could be more subtly interpreted as foreshadowing the policy-maker’s time
inconsistency problem: if we focus on the long-distant future then we will fail to recognise,
and resolve, the temptations that policy-makers face in the short-term.
5Barro and Gordon do not refer directly to NAIRU and monetarism more generally fo-
cusses on a natural rate equilibrium (implying labour market clearing), but their analysis
is also logically consistent with a NAIRU equilibrium concept (which allows for involuntary
unemployment).
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bt(pit − pi
e
t) (6)
Taking into account these benefits and costs and expressing in expected
present value terms, the policy-maker will be minimising the following loss func-
tion:
Zt = E[zt + (1/(1 + rt)) · zt+1 + (1/(1 + rt)(1 + rt+1)) · zt+2 + ...] (7)
where rt denotes the discount rate between period t and t+1, and the discount
factor is given by:
qt =
1
(1 + rt)
(8)
In Barro and Gordon’s model, when policy-makers transgress by cheating on
their policy commitments to a NAIRU target, then they will be punished. This
punishment is delivered via enforcement from private agents, who adjust their
expectations to the detriment of the policy-maker, making it harder for policy-
makers to achieve their NAIRU targets in the future. With exponential dis-
counting, the expected present value of this enforcement cost is given by:
Enforcement = E[qt(zt+1 − z
*
t+1)] = q˜ · (1/2)(b¯
2)a (9)
The policy-maker balances this cost against their temptation, i.e. the bene-
fits they will accrue in the short-term if they cheat on their commitments.
Temptation = (1/2)(b¯)2/a (10)
So the policy-maker will cheat on their commitments where the benefits
captured in the temptation relation (10) are greater than the costs captured in
the enforcement relation (9).
4.2 A Behavioural Reputational Model of Policy-making
Note that the discount factor in Barro and Gordon’s model is given by equation
(8). But the trade-offs facing the policy-maker will change if behavioural insights
about intra-personal time inconsistency are embedded into this game, specifi-
cally if the exponential discounting assumption is replaced with a behavioural
discount function, e.g. Laibson’s quasi-hyperbolic discounting function [13, 11].
Specifically, q can be replaced with the behavioural quasi-hyperbolic discount
factor:
D(t) = βδt = β[
1
1 + r
]t (11)
where 0 < β < 1
Temptation, is by definition, a short-termist strategy, so the Temptation
relation is not changed by incorporating a behavioural discount function. The
Enforcement relation, however, does change because it is about the present value
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of consequences in the future from cheating today. Allowing for present bias,
this becomes:
Enforcement = βδ · (1/2)(b¯2)a (12)
Note that the present bias parameter is less than 1 i.e. 0 < β < 1, so
it follows that βδ < q. Therefore, with the present bias associated with quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, the present value of the enforcement costs from cheating
are less, and therefore - ceteris paribus - the likelihood that the policy-maker
will cheat is increasing in the degree of present bias, i.e. as β approaches zero.
In this way, behavioural present bias magnifies the degree of inflationary bias
seen in Barro and Gordon’s baseline model. Note also that when β = 1, then
Barro and Gordon’s rational expectations result holds because, in that case,
βδ = q.
5 Policy Implications and Conclusions
The model introduced in this paper takes basic insights about time inconsistency
from the behavioural and rational expectations literature to capture dynamic
strategic interactions between policymakers and private (rational) agents in the
macroeconomy. Relaxing the assumption of rationality to embed present bias
has implications in terms of the discounting of future consequences from current
policy choices, leading to interactions between intra-temporal time-inconsistency
and inter-temporal/institutional time-inconsistency. Thus this paper provides a
behavioural economics alternative to the rational expectations account of strate-
gic interactions between private agents and policy-makers, demonstrating how
behavioural biases, specifically present bias in the context of time inconsistency,
change policy-makers’ trade-offs. Whilst applied here to macroeconomic policy-
making, it also has implications for policy-making more generally, for example
industrial regulation and public-sector infrastructure investment policy.
What does it add to the policy debates? In the rational expectations liter-
ature, time inconsistency is essentially an inter-personal/institutional problem
emerging from self-interested strategic interactions between rational optimising
agents and policy-makers. Rational agents anticipate that policy-makers will
have incentives to reverse initial policy announcements, reducing welfare rela-
tive to a position in which a policy-maker credibly commits to a stable policy.
Aware of the possibility of policy reversal, individual agents will anticipate these
policy reversals, and thus these policies will be ineffective. Overall, interactions
between private agents and unreliable policy-makers deliver outcomes that are
socially sub-optimal but, from an individuals perspective - whether a private
agent or a policy-maker, their decisions cannot be improved, which is why in-
stitutional reforms are important. In the context of macroeconomic policy, in-
dependent central banks are an example of an institutional reform designed to
resolve self-interested conflicts between rational agents and policy-makers. Dele-
gation to independent policy-makers, removed from political pressures, can help
to reduce problems created by time-inconsistency, assuming that the delegated
authorities are not prone to rent-seeking in other ways.
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This paper shows, however, that institutional present bias and time incon-
sistency are only part of the problem. Problems are likely to be magnified in
the context of behavioural present bias, when intra-personal time inconsistency
magnifies inter-personal time inconsistency. In terms of solutions, well-designed
institutions can play a role in mitigating time-inconsistency problems, if comple-
mented by behavioural macroeconomic policy solutions. For example if effective
pre-commitment mechanisms for policy-makers, e.g. long-term contracts, can
be enforced, then this will ensure that policy-makers’ decisions are more far-
signted. There also connections with other areas of behavioural economics that
develop new theoretical insights about trust and reciprocity. If trust can be built
between private agents and policy-makers then that will operate to decrease the
probability that either party will default on their announced commitments.
In terms of future directions for this research, to assess the real world impacts
of this analysis quantitative analysis is needed to infer something about the de-
gree of present bias affecting policy-makers’ decisions - more likely via calibrated
simulations given the difficulties around identifying policy-makers’ behavioural
parameters from published statistics. In addition - theoretically, further anal-
ysis is being conducted to explore how the balance between temptation and
enforcement will vary across the 4 types of agents identified by O’Donoghue
and Rabin, with these insights applied to the policy-making eco-system.
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